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  ‘ALONE ON A WIDE, WIDE SEA’

  ‘ALONE ON A

  WIDE, WIDE SEA’

  The Story of 835 Naval Air Squadron

  in the Second World War

  by

  E. E. Barringer

  LEO COOPER

  LONDON

  First published in Great Britain in 1995 by

  LEO COOPER

  190 Shaftesbury Avenue, London WC2H 8JL

  an imprint of

  Pen & Sword Books Ltd,

  47, Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorks, S70 2AS

  © E. E. Barringer, 1995

  ISBN 0 85052 278 1

  A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

  Typeset by Phoenix Typesetting, Ilkley, West Yorkshire.

  Printed by Redwood Books Ltd,

  Trowbridge, Wilts.

  CONTENTS

  Introduction

  1

  Conception

  2

  Birth

  3

  Adolescence

  4

  Maturity

  5

  ‘This was their finest hour’

  6

  Envoi

  Appendix 1.

  Commanding Officers of 835 Squadron

  2.

  Pilots and Observers of 835 Squadron

  3.

  Awards and decorations

  4.

  Aircraft flown on carrier-based operations

  Bibliography

  Index

  ILLUSTRATIONS

  Between pp. 22–23

  1. The original squadron at HMS Buzzard, February, 1942.

  2. The Squadron at HMS Landrail, November, 1942.

  3. The Squadron fighter pilots – early 1945.

  4. HMS Nairana.

  5. HMS Battler.

  6. HMS Furious.

  7. Fairey Swordfish II.

  8. Hawker Sea Hurricanes IIc.

  9. Grumman Martlet II.

  Between pp. 54–55

  10. Skua in collision with Swordfish, 9 February, 1943.

  11. Beaufighter crashes in Gibraltar, 7 September, 1944.

  12–17. Some of the aircrew.

  Between pp. 86–87

  18. ‘Dusty’ Miller.

  19. Some of the telegraphist air gunners.

  20–22. Landing on HMS Nairana.

  23. Barry Barringer speaking, February, 1944.

  24. Wilf Waller’s party, HMS Chaser.

  Between pp. 118–119

  25. George Gordon with Al Bingham.

  26. Standing by in the Aircrew Ready Room.

  27. Lt Cdr Edgar Bibby.

  28. Lt Cdr Nigel Ball.

  29. Bob Selley.

  30. A Swordfish landing on HMS Nairana.

  31. A Wildcat landing on HMS Nairana.

  32. A Seafire landing on HMS Battler.

  33. A Sea Hurricane landing on HMS Nairana.

  Between pp. 134–135

  34. A Swordfish armed with ‘Oscar’ crashes.

  35. Joe Supple nearly goes over the side.

  36. Bill Armitage nearly goes over the side.

  37. Pete Blanco ends up in the barrier.

  38. Swordfish taking off …

  39. … and landing.

  40. A Swordfish is ‘struck down’ aboard HMS Battler.

  41. A Swordfish revs up in preparation for take-off.

  42. Officers of HMS Vindex clear the flight deck of snow.

  43. Clearing the snow from HMS Campania’s flight deck.

  44. HMS Nairana in heavy seas.

  45. Mist rising from the sea round a convoy to Russia.

  46. Nairana’s ships bell.

  47. Seamen clearing the flight deck.

  48. HMS Nairana after conversion to the MV Port Victor.

  49. Forty years on!

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  Passages from Wings of the Morning by Ian Cameron and Bring Back my Stringbag by Lord Kilbracken are reproduced by kind permission of the authors.

  Photographs 6, 8, 9 and 46 are reproduced by permission of the Fleet Air Arm Museum. Photographs 42, 43, 45, and 47 are reproduced by permission of the Imperial War Museum (London). I should like to thank both museums for tracking down these wartime pictures. All the photographs belong to members of the Squadron, who have been remarkably generous and patient in letting me use them. My grateful thanks to you all.

  My thanks too to our ‘resident artist’, Jock Bevan, who supplied the original cartoons (drawn in ’44 and ’45), and who also designed the squadron crest of which we are all very proud. What a team effort this has been!

  INTRODUCTION

  You may wonder why, in the mid-1990s, this story of a Naval Air Squadron in the Second World War has been so belatedly written.

  It has been written first because, even after all these years, it is a good story: a story of brave men in outdated aircraft who carried out combat missions in conditions as difficult as airmen have ever had to fly in. To quote the Official Naval History: “Aircraft operating from escort-carriers, often in heavy seas and appalling weather, played a vital role in defending our convoys in the North Atlantic. Without the protection provided by these carrier-based aircraft many convoys would never have reached the British Isles with their vital supplies, or Russia with their vital equipment.” Convoy protection was the raison d’être of our being. For three years this is what we trained for and what we did, and it seems to me the story of how we did it is worth telling.

  Another reason for writing the story of 835 Squadron is that it fills a niche in history. There have been books before about Fleet Air Arm carriers like Illustrious, and Fleet Air Arm achievements like helping to sink the Bismarck, and crippling the Italian fleet at Taranto, but the story of a Fleet Air Arm squadron from start to finish has never been told.

  My final reason for writing Alone on a Wide, Wide Sea is that everyone who served in the squadron during the war has now passed his allotted three-score-years-and-ten; the feeling is that if we don’t reminisce today, we may not have the chance tomorrow! So as the C.O. and one of the longest-serving members of the Squadron, I decided to get writing!

  * * *

  I believe that an Introduction is the proper place to say one’s “thank yous”.

  Many pilots, observers and air-gunners who served in the squadron during the war have sent me reminiscences from addresses as disparate as New Zealand, Canada, the United States, France, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Thames Ditton and the House of Lords. This is their story, told as far as possible in their words. Without their help it could not have been written. So thank you all. And special thanks to Bob Selley, who spent so much time behind the scenes bringing us all together after a gap of more than 40 years.

  I am also grateful to the staff of the Public Record Office at Kew, to David Brown, head of the Naval Historical Branch in the Ministry of Defence, and to my wife Lesley for her encouragement and help and for typing what must have seemed like an endless succession of drafts.

  Finally, I should like to thank those ship’s officers of HMS Nairana who have given me help. In the latter part of the war our fortunes were linked to those of the escort-carrier Nairana. She was our ship. We were her squadron. This is our story.

  E.E. Barringer

  Dunedin, New Zealand

  1994

  I

  CONCEPTION

  I was on my way to join 835 Naval Air Squadron, with orders to “repair forthwith to HMS Raven”. Raven, I knew, was not an aircraft carrier but a somewhat nondescript shore establishment near Eastleigh, at the south-west tip of the Downs.

  It was snowing when I got off the train at Eastleigh. The date was 20 January, 1942. I remember that because the nex
t day was going to be my 21st birthday. I was cold and tired, having spent the previous night travelling south from Liverpool; someone with local knowledge got to the one and only taxi before me, and by the time I arrived at HMS Raven I wasn’t exactly full of joie de vivre. My spirits were not revived when I discovered nobody was expecting me, and nobody had ever heard of 835 Squadron. However, I was given a cabin, and when I’d unpacked I made my way to the wardroom. Alas, it was deserted and the bar locked. After a solitary meal, I decided the only option was bed.

  I remember telling myself, before I dropped off to sleep, that everything would be OK tomorrow when the rest of the squadron turned up. That is the way it always seemed to be in the Fleet Air Arm. Our planes might look like relics from the First World War; our modus operandi might have serious affinities with the fleet orders issued before Trafalgar; but there was nothing wrong with the air crew. And they, after all, were what mattered. For as the old Greek historian put it, “it is not walls that make a city but the men who man them.”

  Yet looking back after fifty years, I can’t help thinking how much less costly the war at sea would have been for the allies, and how many ships and how many lives would have been saved, if we had been given decent equipment.

  To understand why we were denied such equipment and why, throughout the war, we were tied as by an umbilical cord to our antediluvian past, we need to know something of the early history of the Fleet Air Arm.

  * * *

  During the First World War the Army and the Navy each controlled its own individual “wing” for flying; Army flying was carried out under the aegis of the Royal Flying Corps, Naval flying under the aegis of the Naval Air Service. This was a sensible arrangement, and one which most other countries, including America and Japan, have adhered to from that day to this. However, on 1 April, 1918, the two “wings” of the Army and the Navy were combined to form a single new service, the Royal Air Force.

  The date of this amalgamation – All Fools’ Day – might be thought significant. For in a moment of self-abnegation, which for the Navy was to prove tragic, the Sea Lords handed over 2,949 aircraft, 126 aerodromes and 67,000 officers and men. And, what was worse, they lost control over the future of their air arm.

  So throughout the 1920s and most of the 1930s it was the RAF who provided planes, aircrew and maintenance personnel for the Navy. In times of retrenchment and financial parsimony, the RAF had little enough to spend on its own requirements and even less to spend on the Navy’s. So when eventually a growing body of opinion in the Navy began to ask for its air arm to be upgraded, they got a chilling response: “the Air Ministry favours not the expansion but the drastic reduction of the aircraft-carrying capacity of the Fleet.” If the Navy wanted a carrier they were told there was no money to build one; they had to adapt an existing warship. If they wanted a plane there was no money for that either; they had to make do with an RAF castoff.

  This unhappy state of affairs may have been aggravated by inter-service rivalry; but the root of the trouble lay deeper. The unpalatable truth is that in the Navy itself those responsible for the development of the service looked backward rather than forward. They failed to appreciate the potential of aircraft as weapons of war – “the aeroplane,” reads a Sea Lord’s memo of the ’20s “will be of little practical use to the Fleet.” High-ranking naval officers continued to put their trust in the heavy guns of their battleships which had for so long maintained Great Britain’s naval supremacy throughout the world; they had no time for new-fangled weapons which took them out of their traditional element. There are none so blind as those who do not wish to see.

  So between the wars the Fleet Air Arm stagnated in the doldrums.

  There was, however, one bright spot. Flying with the Navy was never popular with RAF aircrew; and in 1924 it was decided to send a small number of naval officers – there were never more than forty in any one year and sometimes as few as twelve – to train as pilots at Netheravon and as observers at Lee-on-Solent. The men who volunteered for this training had to be fanatics. For the Air Arm in those days was considered a backwater; it was unpopular with senior officers; promotion was slow and pegged to a low level; planes lagged at least five years behind their RAF counterparts, and flying from carriers involved a constant battle with the forces of reaction. However, the men who trained at Lee and Netheravon had a point to prove; they were determined to show the powers-that-be that naval aviation had a future, and that this future lay not with the RAF but with the Navy. To do this, they found it necessary to achieve an exceptionally high standard of flying: to fly in all weathers and never crash on take-off or landing, never to get lost, never on fleet manoeuvres to mistake a battleship for a cruiser. It is of course more difficult to land-on and take-off from a carrier than an airfield; it is more difficult to drop a torpedo than a bomb, and navigation over the featureless sea is far more difficult than over land. Those able to meet these demanding standards found themselves sharing a special esprit de corps, and bonded into what might be described as an unintentionally élitist club. And in 1937 the dream of these “fanatics” was realized. The Fleet Air Arm was handed back to the Navy.

  This came about not because the Sea Lords suddenly woke up to the importance of air power, but because they couldn’t stomach the thought of Lord Trenchard getting hold of their carriers and aircrew. In 1936 Lord Trenchard, “the father of the modern RAF”, made a succession of speeches in which he claimed dominion for the RAF over everything remotely connected with the air – including the Fleet Air Arm. This so incensed senior naval officers that they clutched their hitherto unwanted child to their bosom and insisted on taking control of all aspects of naval aviation.

  The years of bondage were over. But their legacy remained.

  In 1937 the Navy embarked on a crash programme of building carriers, updating its aircraft and training its personnel. But eighteen months of frantic activity couldn’t compensate for eighteen years of neglect. The war, for the Fleet Air Arm, came too soon; and to quote the official Naval Staff History:

  “In 1939 the air component of the Fleet had not reached that stage of development which world progress in aviation justified … Not only was the Navy deficient in the numbers of its aircraft and their technical development, it was lacking in personnel with experience in carrying out its aviation activities.”

  To confirm this we need only look at the seven carriers, 232 aircraft, and 2,000-odd personnel with which the Fleet Air Arm went to war.

  The carriers were a job lot. Only one, the Ark Royal, had been specially designed to operate aircraft; the others were interwar conversions or First World War museum pieces. The Ark Royal was a fine ship; but being the first of her class she had teething troubles; her lifts were too small and wrongly positioned; she had no radar, and could operate fewer aircraft less efficiently than her American and Japanese counterparts. Of the others the Glorious and Courageous were inadequately armoured and alarmingly top-heavy (in any sort of sea they rolled so heavily they couldn’t operate their aircraft); the Furious spouted smoke like a blowing whale through her deck-plates, while the Argus was described by one spotter as “a small dismasted hulk, on fire aft”, and by another as “a wreck floating bottom up”. It is true that five new fleet carriers of the Illustrious class were being built, but none was ready for service in 1939. Significantly, no thought had been given to building escort-carriers: i.e. carriers that could be used to escort and protect convoys.

  The aircraft were as bizarre as the carriers. They consisted of 140 torpedo-bombers-cum-reconnaissance planes, thirty dive-bombers-cumfighters, twenty-four fighters (nearly all of them biplanes) and thirty-eight seaplanes. With a single exception, none of these aircraft was capable of efficiently carrying out the purpose for which it had been designed. One reason for this was that between the wars the Fleet Air Arm had been so starved of aircraft that it had tried to make do with multi-purpose planes: for example the Skua, which was supposed to act as both dive-bomber and fighter, an unlik
ely combination which resulted in it being a disaster in both roles. Another reason for the poor performance of naval aircraft was that senior officers insisted that carrier-based planes had to carry an observer (or navigator), the thinking being that pilots flying over the sea by themselves were bound to get lost. An extra passenger meant extra size; extra size meant extra weight. The result was that when the Fleet Air Arm’s latest fighter, the two-seater Fulmar, at last came into service, it turned out to be slower and more cumbersome than the German and Italian bombers which it was supposed to shoot down. For those who are technically minded, it would be possible to go on listing the shortcomings of British naval aircraft for page after page. For the average reader, it is enough to know that 90 per cent of them were biplanes with fabric wings, no flaps, constant-pitch propellors and fixed undercarriages; in most cases their top speed was lower than that of many planes in the First World War! What a contrast to the thousand-odd aircraft of the U.S. Navy: all, in 1939, monoplanes, all with retractable undercarriages, and many able to fly at double the speed of their British counterparts.

  Among this tatterdemalion rabble there was, however, one aircraft which was to prove an unexpected success; indeed it would be no exaggeration to say it became something of a legend. The fleet’s torpedo-bomber-cum-reconnaissance plane, the Fairey Swordfish, looked out of date in 1939, yet it turned out to be so successful that it was the only aircraft of any of the combatants to remain in service throughout the war – indeed more Swordfish were operational on the last day of hostilities than on the first.

  These remarkable aircraft were the work-horses of 835 Squadron. We flew them from the day we were formed until the day we were disbanded; so a few facts about them are not out of place.

  Swordfish were the brain child of Captain (subsequently Admiral) H.C. Rawlings, who in 1930 put forward the idea that the Navy needed a plane which could not only spot and reconnoitre but could also deliver a torpedo attack: “a plane with a sting in its tail”. The Sea Lords were unresponsive; so Rawlings took his idea to Fairey, whose chief designer, Marcel Lobelle, drew up the specification for a prototype. In 1933, on only its second flight, Lobelle’s creation went into a flat spin that it couldn’t get out of, crashed and was burned to the proverbial cinder. It says much for Rawlings’s tenacity and Fairey’s commitment that they didn’t give up. After eighteen months of redesigning and restructuring, a second prototype took to the air, and its trials proved so successful that an order was placed, and in May, 1935, the first Swordfish were delivered to the Navy. Nine and a half years and 2,399 aircraft later, the last was delivered.